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Structured securitizations transform traditional default and interest-rate
risks into hard-to-understand and hard-to-monitor counterparty and funding
risks that in distressed times pass onto financial safety nets. This Essay
explains the chain of incentive conflicts that led private and government
supervisors to neglect their commonsense moral obligation to understand and
control these risks and to underinvest in planning and staffing for adverse
events. Lack of planning for the bursting of the mortgage-lending bubble made
it easy for asset-backed securities markets to sink into turmoil and for
authorities to adopt policies that turned market turmoil into crisis. The analysis
makes it clear that to bring safety-net subsidies under control, the United States
does not need to make major changes in the structure of its regulatory
bureaucracy. What it needs to repair is the incentive structure under which
financiers and government officials operate.
Introduction
The disastrous meltdown of structured securitization represents a dual
failure of market discipline and government supervision. At every stage of the
securitization process, incentive conflicts tempted private and government
supervisors to short-cut and outsource duties of due diligence that they owed
not only to one another, but to customers, investors, and taxpayers.
Much of the conflict traces to the difficulty of reconciling differences in
time horizons between principals and agents. When commissions and other fees
for service are paid upfront, managers and line employees of firms that
originate, securitize, rate, or insure loans fear that they are passing up short-run
income whenever they nix a questionable deal. At the same time, accountants,
appraisers, and even government supervisors know that they can win business
from competing enterprises in the short run by establishing a reputation for not
challenging a troubled client's dodgy representations about asset values or not
conscientiously assessing its efforts to transfer risks off balance sheet.
t James F. Cleary Professor in Finance, Boston College. The author is grateful to Rex du Pont, Michael
Pomerleano, and the editors for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Yale Journal on Regulation
For government supervisors, incentive conflicts trace not only to short
horizons, but also to clientele influence and to pressure to support the
expansion of homeownership for low-income households. As credit spreads
increased in 2007 and 2008, these incentive conflicts led authorities to
temporize by adopting policies that risked allowing the depth and duration of
the crisis to increase. Ignoring the lessons of the savings and loan (S&L) mess,
Federal Reserve press releases and speeches by Chairman Ben Bernanke and
New York Federal Reserve President Tim Geithner repeatedly misframed the
difficulties that highly leveraged and short-funded institutions faced in rolling
over their debt as evidencing a shortfall in aggregate market liquidity rather
than volatile and widespread concerns about the individual solvency of troubled
institutions.' The following passage typifies the way Fed officials interpreted
the crisis before September 2008:
In this environment, banks have faced several different types of liquidity and
funding challenges. They have been called on to fund a range of different
contingent liquidity and credit commitments, as is typically the case in crises.
The substantial impairment of securitization and syndication markets has been
an additional challenge because it has reduced banks' access to liquidity and
their capacity to move assets off balance sheets. As the market value of many
securities has declined, and investors have reduced their willingness to finance
more risky assets, liquidity conditions have eroded further. In response, even the
strongest institutions have become much more cautious, building up large
cushions of liquidity, bringing down leverage and reducing financing for their
leveraged counterparties.
This Essay attributes the ongoing financial crisis instead to economic and
political difficulties of monitoring and controlling the production and
distribution of safety-net subsidies. Regulation-induced innovation by regulated
firms outstripped both the monitoring technology and the administrative focus
of supervisory personnel. Moreover, the interaction of regulatory arbitrage with
rigid capital regulation added positive feedback that intensified the bubble.
Crisis pressures will not relent until access to safety-net subsidies has
been capped and managers and authorities acting together find a way to quell
doubts about the future viability of institutions known to be struggling with
outsized losses. This can be done in the short run by temporarily nationalizing
deeply insolvent zombie firms and by producing and publicizing convincing
forensic evidence that their insolvency has been repaired.
The Essay goes on to argue that, to reduce the threat of future crises, the
critical task is not to reform the architecture of financial regulation, but to
repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government
supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net. As explained in earlier
I See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Reserve Bd. (Mar. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080316a.htm.
2 Timothy Geithner, The Current Financial Challenges: Policy and Regulatory Implications,
Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations Corporate Conference 2008, New York City (Mar. 6,
2008).
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research,3 a country's financial safety net is a multidimensional policy scheme
whose mission is to balance the costs and benefits generated by: (1) protecting
financial-institution customers from being blindsided by insolvencies; (2)
limiting aggressive risk-taking by financial firms; (3) preventing and
controlling damage from runs; (4) detecting and resolving insolvent
institutions; and (5) allocating across society whatever losses occur when an
insolvent institution is closed. Unless the safety net is backed up by solid crisis
planning, cumulative extensions of the safety net are apt to result in less
frequent but more devastating crises. The more effective a nation's safety net
becomes, the less likely it is that regulatory personnel will have prior hands-on
experience in coping with the severity of crisis pressures.
Proposals that would redesign regulatory instruments (such as risk-based
capital requirements) or rearrange bureaucratic responsibilities for
administering particular elements of the safety net (by merging two or three
related agencies or expanding the mission of the Federal Reserve) without
remedying the incentive conflicts that reward the mismanagement of safety-net
resources will postpone rather than promote genuine reform. Genuine reform
entails making financial-institution managers and federal regulators jointly
responsible for conscientiously estimating and controlling in a timely manner
the safety-net consequences of emerging financial contracts and institutional
forms.
I. Financial Crises and Bubbles
Under the regulatory regimes that exist today, financial crises and bubbles
are inevitable. Every country's financial sector passes through successive three-
stage sequences of: (1) precrisis bubbles in the price of important assets; (2) a
period of actual crisis; and (3) a postcrisis interval of healthy economic
recovery. Although crises make themselves known immediately, no one can
say precisely when a healthy recovery degenerates into a bubble. Moreover,
authorities must expect parties that benefit from sustaining an emerging bubble
to hide their weakness and to resist supervisory attempts to label such
transitions honestly.
It is important to recognize the nature and extent of industry and
governmental disinformation and to understand how disinformation intensifies
and prolongs the course of bubbles and crises. Bubbles and crises arise
dialectically. During a bubble, regulated institutions routinely enlarge their
access to implicit safety-net subsidies by devising innovative instruments that
serve in part to increase information asymmetries between risk-takers and
whatever private and governmental parties are charged with monitoring their
risk-taking.
3 Edward J. Kane, Financial Safety Nets: Reconstructing and Modeling a Policymaking
Metaphor, 3 J. INT'L. TRADE & ECON. DEV. 237 (2001).
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Each generation of regulators and supervisors inherits tools that are
tailored to previous crisis experience. Part of the work of what we might call a
"bubble-blower" is to undercut the ability of these tools to control safety-net
subsidies. Institutions extract subsidies from the safety net indirectly by
expanding their leverage and/or mismatching the duration of their assets and
liabilities. The more complicated a firm's loss exposures become, the easier it
is for its managers to shift responsibility for absorbing its deepest downside
risks onto national safety nets. Under the cover of what are purported to be
purely resource-saving innovations, financial institutions can expand both
forms of risk-taking in hard-to-observe ways.
The securitization bubble is best understood as a complicated extension of
the simpler government credit-allocation scheme that subsidized builders and
homeowners during the bubble stage of the S&L mess. Until the bubble burst in
1989, implicit subsidies were routed to favored borrowers through federal
deposit insurers and shared with institutions whose deposit liabilities federal
agencies explicitly insured.
Lenders have been willing to shade the interest rates they charged on
housing loans because they presumed that the safety-net costs generated by
these loans would be supervised with a lighter hand than they deserved and
that, in times of banking turmoil, authorities would expand a troubled
institution's access to implicit and explicit federal loans and guarantees. In line
with the second presumption, when the S&L bubble burst, the obligations of
the insolvent S&L deposit insurer (the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation) were sustained by a massive injection of funds from hapless
taxpayers.
To contrast the securitization bubble with the S&L mess, we must
introduce the subsidy-induced participation of important new players into the
activities of the housing-finance sector. Poorly capitalized, state-chartered
nonbank mortgage brokers stepped in to help originate loans, especially to low-
income households targeted by the post-2004 affordable-housing program. To
provide an alternative to insured deposit financing of mortgage loans, a new
layer of agents developed between lenders and safety-net managers. It is
convenient to call these mediating agents "financial engineers." They claimed
that by their joint intervention they could accomplish the quasi-magical task of
turning extremely risky mortgage loans to under-resourced households into
riskless securities. These would-be financial alchemists (accountants,
appraisers, investment banks, derivatives dealers, credit raters, statistical
model-builders, credit insurers, and financial servicers) cooperated in
overstating collateral values and understating institutional leverage and other
risks. Finally, Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), especially Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, became the main channel for distributing housing-
finance subsidies. However, as the scheme began to unravel, the GSEs were
assisted by the Federal Reserve, Federal Home Loan Banks, and the U.S.
Treasury.
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Figure 1 illustrates the incremental dealmaking and oversight entailed in
the financial-engineering business model. As shown in the lower righthand
portion of the diagram, securitization introduces a market in which credit
exposures can be priced and transferred synthetically. Although the safety-net
costs that defective underwriting can generate synthetically are just as
worrisome as those produced in traditional forms of dealmaking, supervisory
authorities allowed profit-making credit-rating organizations (CROs) to oversee
the synthetic market. While the SEC acquired authority to supervise CRO
activities in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, that authority
focused on registering these companies and.overseeing their operations.4 The
language of the Act in no way tasked the SEC with exploring the safety-net
consequences that mistakes in CRO certifications might generate.
Figure 1: The Financial-Engineering Business Model
Financial Engineering: The Modern Credit-Risk
Management Process Uses More Outside
Information and Entails Extra Dealmaking
Deal-Make
Creit Risk Mgt. Groupr-- Pricing'
,Counterparty evaluation ._
Govrn en -Credit limits
Suprviio -Concentration risk mgt. .
"' I " The Crdi
C red iante I  M a "ket
SAFETY NET - CR Supervision
This gap in the ovals representing the structure of governmental and
credit-rating industry oversight of safety-net loss exposures created by risk-
transfer transactions is not accidental. It reflects a series of deeper gaps in
society's ability to enforce five ethical duties that a totally selfless regulator
would gladly embrace. These duties may be seen to operationalize obligations
of competence, loyalty, and care that Kantian logic and common-sense ethics
imply that private and governmental regulators and supervisors owe to U.S.
taxpayers.
The first of these duties is Vision. To lessen the costs generated by
regulation-induced innovations, authorities must continually adapt their
surveillance systems to observe the safety-net implications of new fast-growing
4 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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financial instruments and evolving networks of intracompany and
intercompany connectedness. A good start would be to require each agency's
Inspector General to conduct an annual analysis of the adequacy of agency
policies with respect to asset classes and technologies whose use has been
growing disproportionately.
The second duty is that of Prompt Corrective Action. As envisaged in the
FDIC Improvement Act of 1991,5 Inspectors General must be empowered to
make individual supervisors accept responsibility for seeing that loss-making
institutions are closed or recapitalized before they can impose large losses onto
the safety net. The third duty is that of Efficient Operation. To manage the size
of safety-net expenditures, this duty entails training personnel in crisis
management so that they can detect and resolve financial-institution weakness
at minimum resource cost. The fourth duty is that of Conscientious
Representation. It asks regulatory officials as stewards of the economy to put
society's interest coequal or even ahead of their own (particularly in times of
stress). Such behavior is required routinely from military, police, fire-control,
and nuclear-cleanup personnel.
The fifth and most important duty is that of Accountability. As a way of
bonding their commitment to fulfill each of the first four duties, internal and
external supervisors must make themselves accountable for neglecting or
botching them. This requires that authorities explain and document at least the
following three points: why they adopt one set of policies rather than another,
how they expected these policies to work, and how (if at all) results diverged
from their plan.
II. Principles of Crisis Management
Crisis management unfolds in two dimensions. The first dimension takes
place in the arena of political economy. It centers on identifying losses and
continuing loss exposures that troubled financial institutions and their
counterparties can unload onto taxpayers. Uncertainties about the ultimate size
of these losses and about who will end up having to bear them keeps a crisis
going. For troubled firms, the idea is to frame the dangers particular losses pose
in a manner that makes it seem to be in society's interest not to let the losses
reside with parties who volunteered to absorb them when the bubble was
expanding.
The second dimension is administrative. Ideally, officials should resolve
both uncertainties promptly, decisively, and efficiently. Implementing such a
strategy can establish confidence in the judgment and competence of top
officials. Adopting and holding to a sensible program can also make it easier to
persuade the public that the pattern of loss-shifting chosen is an appropriate one
5 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105
Stat. 2236, 2263 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (2006)).
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and that the beneficiaries of the program deserve the assistance they have been
offered. However, in practice, officials tend to act chaotically.
For crisis managers, the first steps are both the most important and the
hardest to execute well.6 A financial crisis resembles a battlefield. The financial
arena is littered with wounded firms, all screaming for immediate treatment.
The policy problem is how best to contain the further loss of life and limb.
Containment begins with sorting firms into three groups: those that are beyond
help, those that need virtually no assistance, and those that might be able to
survive with a reasonable degree of government intervention.
Supervisory "medics" charged with this task face hostile fire from
lobbyists and have limited tools with which to accomplish the kind of triage
that would be most effective. In most countries, even if they could prioritize
wounded firms appropriately, safety-net officials lack the administrative
vehicles they need to move the wounded where they ought to go. Certifiably
healthy institutions should be patted on the back and sent back into the fray.
Moribund firms need either to be sent to a corporate morgue or to be put into
conservatorship before portfolio rot and zombieness can set in. Provisional
survivors should be assigned to a watchlist administered by a deposit-insurer's
resolution division whose staffs ought to have been carefully trained (and given
experience) in restructuring failing enterprises.
Figure 2 presents a chart that is divided into three panels. It outlines the
dialectical sequence of governmental policies that supported the housing-
finance bubble and identifies the choke points and incentive conflicts that
subsequently led to its bursting. The second panel presumes that, when a
bubble first begins to burst, incentive conflicts tempt authorities to try to cover
up the depth of emerging financial-institution insolvencies and to adopt showy,
but ineffective, patterns of response. Their hope is to move the problem
temporarily off the public's radar screen. If successful, this shifts responsibility
for truly resolving the problem to the next generation of government officials.
7
6 Edward J. Kane & Daniela Klingebiel, Alternatives to Blanket Guarantees for Containing a
Systemic Crisis, I J. FIN. STABILITY 31 (2004). Kane & Klingebiel stress the importance of
understanding and controlling the risk-taking incentives of insolvent institutions across all the three
phases of a crisis. Id. at 51. Based on a detailed analysis of policies followed in twelve recent crises,
they advise safety-net managers to adopt policies that estimate losses during the initial triage phase and
allocate these losses promptly during follow-on containment and restructuring phases. Id. at 62.
7 EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989).
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Figure 2: Dialectics of Bubble and Crisis
Panel 1
Thesis: Unsustainable policy mix creates a bubble.
* Low interest rates fueled the loss-causing credit-allocation scheme
("politically sabotaged loans") vs. consequent desupervision of risk and
rising costs of providing loans and guarantees to loss-making institutions.
Panel 2
Antithesis: Market forces test governments' ability to manage the expanding
costs of national safety nets.
* In a banking crisis, market tests consist of silent runs (symptomized by a
generalized flight to both quality and simplicity).
* The longer authorities play "coverup," create new uncertainties, and
delay action designed to contain the damage, thereby helping zombie
institution to stay in play, the more the probability of further tests and a
deepening crisis grows.
Panel 3
Synthesis: Meaningful reform occurs when authorities can no longer quell
market doubts about their ability to sustain the contradictory policy mix of
subsidizing and limiting leverage.
" Credit-allocation scheme unravels.
" Cost of sustaining decapitalized institutions becomes manifest.
" Regulatory/supervisory system is reorganized in a plausible way.
The synthesis whose unfolding is described in the third panel clarifies that
keeping zombie institutions in play is extremely costly and that, as these costs
multiply and become manifest, the poverty of these policies is revealed and the
need to undertake effective triage eventually becomes inescapable. The middle
item in this panel represents the situation in which authorities find themselves
today. The credit-allocation scheme has broken down and authorities recognize
the need for "plausible" reform of regulatory and supervisory systems. As this
Essay goes to press, an interagency working group is drafting a comprehensive
program of re-regulation. Confidential sources indicate that the draft program
would expand the crisis-management and supervisory authority of the Federal
Reserve without addressing the incentive conflicts that would inevitably
corrupt the exercise of that authority. One may hope, though it is unlikely, that
the politics of policymaking can allow re-regulation to include accountable
ways of measuring and controlling the creative manner in which institutions
extract implicit and explicit subsidies from the safety net.
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III. A Medley of Potentially Effective Reforms
There is no permanent way to prevent bubbles and crises from emerging.
8
Still, numerous complementary actions could improve the odds of getting less-
destructive bubbles and better crisis management in the future. To be effective,
a program of reform will have to rework-in both the private and public sectors
-the type of information that is collected and the way in which supervisory
activities are performed and compensated. More importantly, it will have to
make sure that compensation schemes and the division of labor mesh across
private and governmental elements of the financial-engineering transaction
chains depicted in Figure 1. A preliminary test of the value of each and every
program element is to analyze whether and how it might have improved the
interaction of private and governmental incentives during the securitization
bubble and its aftermath.
It is convenient to consider first some purely private-sector reforms. Some
of these will be adopted even in the absence of any government mandate. This
will occur if and only if the reform is seen to improve the competitive positions
of firms that adopt it. The first reform is to incorporate explicit and effective
contractual clawbacks for subsequent interruptions in securitized cash flows
into the contracts of employees and firms at all stages of securitization. It is
unwise to allow employees and firms that can make, securitize, or over-rate bad
loans to collect compensation in advance without bonding their work by
accepting liability for future defaults. Bonus payments to senior management
should be subjected to the same delays and contingencies as those offered to a
firm's operating staff. After vesting, bonuses might also be made payable in the
very assets or lowest tranches that each particular employee supervises,
originates, or certifies. Second, much like the bottom lines of corporate income
and balance-sheet statements, the evolving value of the pools of assets backing
various securitized claims needs to be tracked individually and reported
explicitly at regular intervals (say, monthly). This would make it easier for
investors and supervisors to identify securitization chains in which the
performance of due diligence is subpar. Third, credit-rating organizations must
change the way they rate asset-backed securities and take explicit responsibility
for errors they make in rating them. In my ideal world, CROs would: (1)
disclose the information they rely on in forming a rating; (2) bond themselves
against negligent construction of rating models or using unrepresentative
samples of data to estimate model parameters; and (3) report not just an
instrument's rating, but also its downward volatility.
Additional reforms could be made in the management and financing of
large financial firms. The crisis makes it clear that such firms failed to plan
sufficiently for the downside. To remedy this, Richard Herring and Jacopo
8 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES (1978). Kindleberger characterizes crises as a "Hardy Perennial." Id. at 3. His book stresses that
speculative bubbles and the crises they induce are "if not inevitable, at least historically common." Id. at
4.
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Carmassi have proposed that managers be required to prepare and file with
their principal regulator a standby plan with which to handle their firm's
bankruptcy and be obliged to update and refile this plan yearly.9 The existence
of these plans would make the threat of putting an insolvent institution into
failure or conservatorship more credible because it would lower the costs of
executing the threat. Having a benchmark winding-up scheme in place would
also make it much easier for authorities both to close out the claims of
stockholders and to haircut uninsured creditors at the moment of takeover.
Explicitly planning for crisis management might also make it politically and
administratively feasible to re-establish some form of extended liability for
owners of financial-institution stock.
To improve incentives in government requires reworking the manner of
recruitment and the employment contracts of top officials. The goal would be
to define their missions more sharply and make them personally accountable
for outsized safety-net expenses. Building on the information used to construct
bankruptcy plans at regulated firms, I would require regulators to establish,
publicize, and test regularly a benchmark market-mimicking scheme for crisis
management. While authorities would be free to deviate from this plan, they
would be obliged to explain why they are doing so. To help them to put crisis-
management plans into operation more promptly, I would also require
regulators to collect and analyze estimates of safety-net subsidies from every
regulated institution and consolidate these estimates in ways that would track
over time the aggregate value of safety-net subsidies for the firms they
supervise. To finish the task, I would ask the Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC
to use these estimates and other relevant data to construct independent
estimates of the evolving value of safety-net subsidies to the financial sector as
a whole.
Because these reforms would make the jobs of top regulators more
difficult, I would also raise the salaries of these officials. However, to lengthen
the horizons of safety-net managers, I would fund this raise as deferred
compensation that would have to be forfeited if a crisis occurred within three or
five years of their leaving office. This would have the further benefit of making
new appointees more cognizant of unresolved problems that his or her
predecessor might be leaving behind. To discourage elected officials from
trying to win special breaks for firms that contribute money to their campaigns,
I would require that regulatory personnel report fully on interactions with
elected officials that occur outside the public eye.
A third approach to sharpening monitoring and loss-control
responsibilities would be to establish schemes in which private and
governmental monitors could hold one another responsible for the quality of
their work. For example, it has been widely proposed that safety-net managers
9 Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International Financial
Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BANKING (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., forthcoming 2009).
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be required to move trading in over-the-counter derivatives and other securities
to clearinghouses or exchanges when and as their volume becomes large
enough to pose material safety-net consequences. Potential suppliers of
clearinghouse services would have strong incentives to see that authorities
carry out this duty. A second variation on this approach would be for deposit
insurers to reinsure their coverages with private parties. This could be done
either by writing credit default swaps or by transacting in reinsurance markets.
Changes in the maturity structure of reinsurance or swap premiums would
forecast future safety-net expenditures. As a third example, federal regulators
could refuse to recognize CRO ratings in setting capital requirements and other
risk-management rules unless the CRO issuing the rating bonded the
government against safety-net losses that could be traced directly to
incompetence or negligence in the rating process.
IV. Summary Implications
Structured securitizations may be visualized as manufacturing risk
exposures in a series of work stations located alongside a conveyor belt. The
different stations produce contracts that create, disguise, assess, reassign, or
insure the risk exposures that move steadily along the belt. During the bubble,
product-quality inspectors located at each station (that is, supervisors) were
using their computer scanners to entertain themselves rather than to inspect
carefully the quality of the work passing by.
Although it is dishonest, it is natural for supervisors to blame the poor
quality of the final product on weaknesses either in their lines of sight or in the
supervisory equipment they had to work with. But giving supervisors more and
better scanners or relocating their work stations will not cure the root problem.
The root problem is the de facto corruption of supervisory incentives that
poorly monitored safety-net subsidies create and sustain. Figure 3 shows how
massive these subsidies have become. This table is part of a larger recipient-by-
recipient table on the Center for Responsive Politics website showing that
TARP recipients paid out $76.7 million on lobbying and $37 million on federal
campaign contributions in 2008 and 0(through February 2, 2009) received access
to $295.2 billion in TARP funds.' The ratio of lobbying expense to TARP
receipts suggests that, during the initial stages of the crisis, financial institutions
reaped extraordinary benefits from investing in efforts to panic federal officials
and to tell them how "best" to dispel crisis pressures. Following this self-
interested advice has proved ineffective partly because the return from
expanding large firms' investments in lobbying activity has dwarfed the return
they could expect to earn from diligently attending to their ordinary business of
intermediating the nation's flow of savings and investment. This lobbying
activity pushes two false hypotheses: that the financial sector is more important
10 Center for Responsive Politics, TARP Recipients Paid Out $114 Million for Politicking
Last Year, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/02/tarp-recipients-paid-out-I 14-m.html.
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than the real sector and that massively expanding access to safety-net subsidies
serves the interest of ordinary taxpayers.
Figure 3: The Balance of Influence: Lobbying Expenses for 2008 by Selected
Large Firms That Received Government Help 1
Company 2008 Lobbying Government Investment
Amount Through Feb. 2, 2009
Bank of America (includes $8.8 million $45 billion
Merrill Lynch)
Citigroup $7.6 million $50 billion
AIG $9.7 million $40 billion
JPMorgan Chase $5.4 million $25 billion
Wells Fargo $1.2 million $25 billion
Goldman Sachs $3.3 million $10 billion
Morgan Stanley $3.1 million $10 billion
PNC Bank $0 million $7.6 billion
U.S. Bancorp $0.570 million $6.6 billion
Capital One $1.1 million $3.6 billion
11 Center for Responsive Politics, TARP Recipients Paid Out $114 Million for Politicking
Last Year, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/02/tarp-recipients-paid-out- I 14-m.html.
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